Adolfo Suárez and Spain’s Transition to Democracy
Adolfo Suárez and the Path to Democracy
Adolfo Suárez’s appointment was greeted with dismay by the press and the opposition. Despite his brilliant career as a manager in various positions, no one believed that a man trained in the movement, despite publicly stating his firm commitment to political reform and the establishment of a democratic system and freedoms, could take forward the reform. The hardliners saw in him a man of little prestige. Suárez was also met with the refusal of Fraga and Areilza to collaborate, and drew up a cabinet of young politicians, among whom were Rodolfo Martín Villa, Landelino Lavilla, Marcelino Oreja, Fernando Abril Martorell, and Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo.
Initial Steps Towards Change
The Government was aware that it could no longer delay the process of change. And from the start, it began to send messages and act unequivocally. The week of July 5-12 was marked by massive pro-amnesty demonstrations that “Platajunta” convened around the country and were answered with a lukewarm performance of the police. On July 14, Parliament approved the reform of the Penal Code that would allow the legalization of political parties. On July 16, the Government issued a statement that spoke of popular sovereignty, democracy, and respect for freedoms. On July 31, an amnesty was approved that allowed the release of many political prisoners, but expressly excluded those convicted of terrorist offenses, leaving the majority of Basque prisoners in prison. This situation provoked a storm of protest in the streets of cities in Euskadi during August.
Contacts with the Opposition and Political Reform
Suárez maintained contacts with all leaders of the opposition, even indirectly with Santiago Carrillo. By then, the Communists were already the only ones who were subject to direct police chase, and the great unknown. This probate was completed on September 10, when Suárez led the country to present the draft Law for Political Reform, the authentic linchpin of the legal transition to political democracy. Originally drafted by Fernández Miranda, it meant a shift to a parliamentary system and a new constituent, from the Francoist institutions. This required the same Cortes in force to approve the law, but it also needed the support of the opposition.
Growing Tensions and the Hardliners’ Resistance
The march of events did increase the irritation among the hardliners. Amnesty, the contacts with the opposition, the proposal for political reform, popular mobilization, and the continuous increase of ETA attacks in September led to the resignation of Lieutenant General De Santiago, Deputy Prime Minister. The appointment of Lieutenant General Gutiérrez Mellado for the office won him the enmity of the hardest military sector, but the new minister would become a decisive figure in the process of transition.
The Political Reform Act and the Referendum
On November 16, the text of the Political Reform Act was debated in Parliament. The negotiations of the ministers and the aperture of many attorneys who believed that the battle was lost finally resulted in a clear vote in favor of the Law: 425 votes for, 59 against, and 13 abstentions. This result was also influenced by the fact that Suárez’s proposal was accompanied by certain guarantees: not to demand responsibility from those involved in the dictatorship and to maintain the illegality of the communist left. In other words, it represented a safe transition, which was only denied by the bunker.
The Reform Act was short, but it affirmed democracy and the principle of popular sovereignty, delivered legislative power to Parliament, set elections by voting and their cleavage in Congress and Senate, and regulated the way for both to assume constitutional reform in the future. It also fixed some aspects of the future electoral law. A referendum was immediately called for December 15 to be approved by popular vote.
Escalating Violence and Pressure
But before that, the climate of tension was rising. The continuing need for a broader amnesty resulted in the deaths of some protesters in clashes with the police. ETA attacks intensified, some as serious as the assassination of the President of the Diputación de Guipúzcoa. The opposition also increased its pressure on the government. The PSOE held its 27th congress in Madrid, dramatically calling many of the international socialist leaders. The opposition named a committee, the Committee of Nine, which called for negotiations with the Government. And meanwhile, the PCE chose to come to light and take a pulse. Suárez Carrillo, secretly living in Madrid since February, gave a dramatic press conference in Madrid, which forced the Minister of the Interior to put the entire police on his trail.
The Referendum and its Aftermath
The referendum was held in a tense environment. Four days before, a new left-wing group, GRAPO, kidnapped the President of the Council of State, Antonio María de Oriol, demanding the release of several prisoners for his ransom. Still, the consultation was a success for the Government, although the opposition had called for abstention. On December 23, the police arrested Santiago Carrillo, but the government released him eight days later, aware that, saving the dignity of the police, it could not detain the communist leader in jail. That same day, December 30, the Court of Public Order was declared dissolved.
A Month of Crisis and Violence
A month after the referendum, the most difficult period of the political transition began. The adoption of measures that restored democratic security to ensure free elections was accompanied by great stress, motivated by GRAPO and ETA terrorist actions. The provocation reached its peak during the week of January 23 to 29. On the 23rd, a student was killed in a pro-amnesty demonstration by guerrillas of Christ the King. The next day, Lieutenant General Villaescusa was kidnapped by GRAPO, a protester was killed by the impact of a smoke pot, and especially the murder by members of the far-right of five labor lawyers of the PCE in an office on Atocha Street, a bombing that left four others wounded. The response of the PCE was, on the day of the burial, an impressive silent demonstration in the center of Madrid, which showed the strength of the party and its internal discipline. The week ended with the murder of two policemen and a civil guard the following week, sent by GRAPO.
Negotiations and the Legalization of the PCE
The violence subsided when Oriol and Villaescusa were released by a police operation, which gave a respite to the Suárez cabinet. By then, Suárez began negotiations with the opposition. The first result was the simplification of the process of legalization of political parties, limited to a long record in the Ministry of the Interior. All political parties were going through the registry. But on February 22, the registration of the PCE was rejected. The legalization of the Communists had become the main obstacle in the march towards the elections, because the bunker, both political and military leaders, turned the PCE into the black beast and the symbol of their resistance to change. But Suárez was clear that it was necessary to legalize the Communists before the elections if they wanted these to be accepted as legitimate by public opinion nationally and internationally.
Dissolution of the Movement and the PCE’s Legalization
On April 1, the government ordered the dissolution of the Movement. And on the 9th, Holy Saturday, enjoying the peace of the holidays and after notifying military ministers, the legalization of the PCE was published. Despite everything, the impact was tremendous. On the 14th, the PCE held a Central Committee plenum, at the end of which the press announced its resignation to raise the Republican alternative and acceptance of the bicolor flag in a gesture to appease the spirits and trying to improve the party’s image before the country. Days later, unions were legalized, and the return of exiles began.