David Hume’s Moral Philosophy: Sentiment and Utility
Hume’s Text
Historical Context
Hume, born in 1711 and died in 1776, lived fully within the Enlightenment and is himself a perfectly orthodox example of it. In philosophy, he is undoubtedly the most relevant empiricist author. His epistemological doctrine had a major impact on Kant and is at the starting point of positivism and neo-positivism of the 19th and 20th centuries. Similarly, his ethics were instrumental in the utilitarianism of Mill and contemporary moral emotivism.
Theme
The theme of the text is the idea that morality comes from a feeling of liking and disliking inscribed in human nature, under which we consider good or virtuous those actions or qualities that have some general use, and not necessarily based on our own selfish interests.
Top Ideas
- When we describe someone as a rival or enemy, the epithets we use reflect feelings related to our interests and particular situation.
- But when we use moral qualifiers, we express a general view that is common to all people.
- This commonality relies on a universal principle of human constitution: we approve of qualities and actions beneficial to society and disapprove of the contrary.
Relationship between Ideas
The text is structured around the contrast between adjectives stemming from our own selfish interests and moral descriptions that require us to think in general terms. This generality is explained later through human nature, which determines the conditions under which we make moral judgments.
Explanation of Ideas
Hume’s purpose in pursuing research on moral principles is to establish a science of morality equivalent to Newtonian science regarding man. This science should avoid unnecessary hypotheses and adhere to a strict analysis of the facts.
Hume’s starting point is the examination of moral distinctions, i.e., the everyday fact that we judge things as good or bad, virtuous or vicious. A long tradition going back to Socrates holds that the origin of these distinctions is found in reason, and knowing the natural order would allow us to judge accordingly. Against this, Hume argues that reason is not capable of determining or preventing an act of will. Neither facts nor the entire area constituting rational knowledge are anything like moral values, and therefore nothing capable of determining the will.
To find concepts such as evil and goodness, we have to look within ourselves, and we will find a sense of approval and disapproval at work. The moral sense, according to Hume, is a feeling of approval or disapproval of certain actions or character traits that has its seat in human nature. This is the common key, which the text speaks of, and it is selfless, not selfish. Our peculiar mental constitution encourages us to approve of certain actions, which are the general virtues. What makes them worthy of approval is the utility or satisfaction that the individual or society obtains from them.
The disinterestedness of which Hume speaks constitutes a defining feature of the view that we value on moral grounds. It rests on an innate sense of sympathy, a capacity to put ourselves in another’s place, which automatically makes us approve of what brings greater good or happiness to society.