Human Nature and Morality: A Humean Perspective
Hume’s Ethics
Locke’s Influence
For Locke, individuals in their natural state are free and equal. This view aligns neither with Rousseau’s belief that “men are naturally good” nor with Hobbes’ assertion that “men are naturally bad”. Locke posits that men, while capable of violating the rights of others (and thus not inherently good), possess an innate moral law discoverable through reason (and thus not inherently bad). Furthermore, individuals have inherent rights, particularly the right to property.
To defend this natural state, law becomes necessary because individuals are unable to repel all aggressions on their own and may overreact when doing so. The conclusion is that polity stems from natural law: it is founded on the consensus of all citizens in a political bargain. Through this covenant, individuals relinquish some freedom to enjoy greater security.
Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature
Hume’s aim is to construct a science of man, hence his main work is titled A Treatise of Human Nature. His theory of knowledge forms only one part. His moral philosophy can be divided into two parts: his critique of moral rationalism and his concept of moral emotivism, which posits feeling as the basis of moral judgments.
Critique of Moral Rationalism
Ethics, or morality, can be defined as “the set of judgments about the goodness or evil of human actions.” Moral judgments guide our behavior; they indicate what actions are good (encouraging us to perform them) and what actions are bad (discouraging us from performing them). The question is: what is the basis for such judgments? Traditional philosophers, from the Greeks onward, have argued that reason is the foundation. Through reason, man understands human nature and acts in accordance with it. Actions against nature are deemed bad, while actions in accordance with nature are deemed good.
Hume critiques this view, arguing that reason cannot be the basis of moral judgments because reason alone cannot motivate action. Intellectual knowledge, whether concerning relations of ideas (e.g., mathematics) or matters of fact, does not inherently drive behavior. Facts themselves, such as a crime, are not moral judgments. The judgment arises within us, based on our feelings. Until we experience a feeling, there is no moral judgment. Therefore, reason alone cannot be the foundation of moral judgments.
Investigaciones about Moral Principles
The Basis of Morality
The basis of morality lies in both reason and feeling. Both are necessary for moral decisions, but the question is to what extent each contributes.
The Moral View: A Work of the Heart
“The approval or blame that follows moral judgments is not the work of the judgment, but of the heart. It is not a speculative proposition, but an active feeling or sentiment.” Virtue is a kind property, while vice is abhorrent. Reason cannot decide the application of these predicates; that belongs to the affective sphere of man.
Decisions Belong to Feeling
“…the rectitude of our disposition is experienced through feelings… In these sentiments, therefore, and not in the discovery of relationships of any kind, all moral determinations consist.” Moral judgments are not based on intellectual investigation but on emotional responses.
“What is honorable, what is good, what is decent, what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart and encourages us to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, claims only the cold feeling of understanding, and meeting a speculative curiosity, ends our investigation. Extinguish all warm feeling… and morality is no longer a practical study and will not have any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.” Morality depends on feeling, not just intellectual understanding.
Morality Depends on a Sense of Complacency
Hume compares natural beauty and moral beauty, noting a resemblance between them. Aesthetics does not depend on reason or intellect but on “experiencing a sense of complacency or taste” that arises from contemplating beauty, whether natural or moral.
Ultimate Ends Belong to Feeling
“It seems clear that the ultimate ends of human actions cannot be explained, in any case, by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without dependence of intellectual faculties.” Moral perception is not a matter of understanding but of feeling, unique to each particular thing, not based on general principles or reason.
We cannot demonstrate something as good or bad through reason alone. Reason is not the master of passions or feelings. If anything, reason is enslaved by passions, which arise from experience: pleasure, pain, fear, hope, hatred, etc. Judgments of approval or disapproval—moral judgments—are judgments of particular facts, driven by passions, and are not necessarily rational.
Hume’s Stance on Religion
Religious truths cannot be proven by reason. Hume rejects both spiritualism and materialism, accepting only direct observation as evidence. The world’s order is a post hoc test, derived from experience, and therefore persuasive. Hume’s ethics cannot be definitively categorized as theistic, atheistic, or agnostic. Ferrater Mora summarizes Hume’s position as “often agnostic, so to speak, moderately theist; but not dogmatically theistic or atheistic.”