Hume’s Moral Emotivism and Social Utility
Hume’s Moral Emotivism and Its Relevance Today
There are certain principles common to all mankind that are responsible for moral sentiments, which are similar and act the same way in all men. Thus, we could all judge helping others as good, and murder as, at worst. Finally, the text stresses the importance of utility to raise the sense of appreciation for the action to qualify a person as virtuous. Therefore, it is stated that what is harmful to society is morally wrong. So, Hume believes that it is social utility, not the individual, which leads to the adoption of an action. Hume’s ethics does not fall into subjectivism, as the feelings on which it is based arise from the consideration that shares from a non-subjective perspective. In addition, the common nature of humans makes such feelings operate in a similar form.
Avoiding Excessive Rationalism
The central ideas of Hume’s emotivism can help us avoid excessive rationalism in seeking the cause of our actions. Often, we do not know how to rationally argue why we have feelings of affinity or rejection towards people, for example, but we cannot avoid them. However, this should not lead us to eliminate responsibility for our actions. The passions that push us to act do not have to be the excuse that justifies any action as a result of an outside force that is imposed. Sartre said that we cannot shirk our responsibility by believing that our passions take us away; “the human being is responsible for his passions.”
Universal Principles in Moral Qualifications
The idea that moral qualifications always come from “common” terms, according to a universal principle of human constitution, is effective today. Moral judgments, despite being set by a particular person, are based on general principles with which the majority of people can agree. However, too often our private interests set the tone for our conduct and the basis of moral judgments. Moreover, not many people today share Hume’s utilitarianism and its consideration that what is harmful to society is to be classified as morally wrong. The individualism of our time is incompatible with Hume’s social utilitarianism.
Hume: Empiricism and Moral Sentiment
British Enlightenment Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century
Hume, the main representative of empiricism, claims that the origin and limits of knowledge are in sensitive experience and denies the existence of innate ideas. A fan of Newton, he wanted to apply the experimental method of modern science to philosophy.
Distinguishing Personal and Moral Qualifications
To morally qualify a person, we do not rely on selfish, particular feelings, but on one common to all men:
- When we say someone is our enemy, we speak a selfish language.
- When we qualify someone as vicious and depraved, that is, when we value them morally, we do so from a standpoint common to all men, moved by a universal principle of human constitution.
- If, when making this assessment, we take as a reference what is harmful to society, we choose the common view of morality itself.
Hume’s Emotivist Moral Defense
In this text, Hume exposes some of the fundamental elements of his emotivist moral defense. The author begins by distinguishing between personal qualifications, particular qualifications, and general or moral qualifications. He also asserts that moral evaluation expresses feelings born of human nature, a nature that contains principles common to all mankind. Finally, the text emphasizes social utility as an essential reference for carrying out moral qualifications.
Opposition to Rationalist Ethics
As is clear from the text, Hume’s ethics opposes any rationalist ethics. Moral judgments, the judgments by which we approve or disapprove of any human behavior, are aimed at pushing man to act. However, according to Hume, it is not reason that moves us to act, but passion, feeling: the hope of pleasure or avoidance of pain that arouses passion. Therefore, reason is “slave of the passions.” Hence, the text states that the rating of vicious, hateful, or depraved, that is, the moral qualifications, “express feelings” (not arguments); this statement is the basis of emotivist morality. This text specifies the characteristics of moral feeling. First, it is a selfless feeling; that is, from the moral point of view, we consider actions or people in general, without reference to our particular interest.