Hume’s Moral Philosophy: Sentiment and Ethics
Ethics: Moral Emotivism
Hume’s ethics are primarily expounded in Book III of A Treatise of Human Nature, titled “Of Morals,” as well as in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and Essays Moral and Political.
Critique of Moral Rationalism
Hume begins by questioning the origin and basis of moral judgments. Traditionally, from Greek thought onwards, the distinction between morally right (good) and morally wrong (bad) was grounded in understanding and reason (rationalism). This argument posited that reason could discern the natural order and, from that knowledge, determine behaviors and attitudes consistent with it (naturalism). However, Hume argues that reason cannot be the foundation of our moral judgments. His argument unfolds as follows:
- Reason alone cannot determine our behavior or prevent it.
- Specific moral judgments do not impede or drive our behavior.
- Therefore, moral judgments do not originate from reason.
Knowledge, as Hume sees it, is limited to relations of ideas (like mathematics) or matters of fact. Mathematical knowledge, while useful, does not inherently promote action. Factual knowledge is confined to observable facts and does not encompass moral judgments. Examining any moral action reveals passions, motives, desires, and thoughts, but not objective characteristics of vice or virtue. Thus, good and evil are not inherent properties of actions but expressions of our feelings about them.
The Role of Feeling: Moral Emotivism
- The Role of Reason and Feeling: The basis of moral judgments lies not in the object but in the subject, not in reason but in sentiment. Reason is primarily theoretical, while feelings and desires drive action.
- The Moral Sentiment: This is a feeling of moral approval or disapproval experienced towards certain actions and human traits. It is natural and disinterested.
Virtue and Vice
When we call an action or mental quality virtuous, we are expressing a feeling of approval. Conversely, calling something a vice expresses disapproval. These feelings arise from human nature; we are predisposed to approve certain things and reject others. Morality begins and ends with human nature. Any quality or action accompanied by the approval of humankind is virtuous. Hume identifies qualities universally approved, categorized as:
- Qualities useful to others (integrity, fairness, truthfulness, loyalty)
- Qualities useful to oneself (prudence, diligence, perseverance)
- Pleasing qualities to others (courtesy, accuracy, wit)
- Pleasing qualities to its possessor (joy, humor, refined taste)
Qualities useless or unpleasant to others or oneself are considered vices. Hume’s moral theory is liberating, offering principles to guide human lives. We must rely on our nature and feelings to find happiness and build a better society. While acknowledging human imperfections, Hume encourages striving for a happier and more humane world.