Kantian Ethics: Duty, Morality, and the Categorical Imperative

A man expresses his freedom when he determines his actions by the idea of duty, by the mandate of reason. Unconditioned morality should be the only autonomous morality, unlike all those that support the validity of moral norms in an extra-human term or the achievement of a goal outside the action itself (the case of happiness). To subordinate the action for this purpose means making it depend on an empirical element, sensitive, not from the inherent nature of man, which is reason. In this, ethics is linked to a conception of man (reconciling the determinism of nature and human freedom).

Kantian Ethics

Moral action is based on meaningful human action and freedom. Duty requires us to be determined by purely rational grounds, independent of any sensible determination (freedom). Morality is based on autonomy, in reason, because there are free behaviors based on human behavior. It is not based on instincts, nor on emotions. Emotions are the hardest part of being free. So, if you talk about freedom, if I want a free moral, I have to give reason (if I find something in common, we will find the reason, never on the emotional side, as per Aristotle’s path).

Free will is a power to produce effects without being determined by anything else than itself. Freedom characterizes a special order of causal action, given that under the principle of autonomy as a capacity to act according to maxims that can be cherished as universal laws.

The moral law is the law of our intelligible existence, determining principles which are different from those governing man in his phenomenal reality.

Two laws and two different domains are distinguished:

  1. The legislation of the natural concept, which legislates understanding the power of knowledge, and its domain of phenomena as the subject of a sensitive nature.
  2. The legislation of the concept of freedom, that reason legislates on the faculty of desire, whose domain is that of things in themselves.

Kant posits a formal moral. It does not tell you what to do because if it did, you would not be an autonomous entity. From the content of actions, the principle of action is at the reason, autonomy. You are free when the source of your thought is you; that is to be free. For morality to be free, I cannot have a moral that tells me the contents of good and evil. A matter for the individual subject cannot tell us the content. The Canon, all materials have a moral canon. Heteronomous morality is material. For Kant, through my reason, I know what to do. The moral law cannot therefore be obeyed by any end outside itself. It is not what is important, but how it is done. What is valuable arises from want, the true center of Kant’s moral autonomy.

Kant comes to universality and that there is something in man that is universal and formal. Kantian moral principles do not tell me what to do but how. The good will is law to itself; only then will is autonomous and free, as the rational nature eludes man to the natural laws and sensible impulses.

Each culture has a way to resolve things. If I want a universal morality, I cannot say the contents of good and bad, because it will not be the same in all cultures. Kant called for principles that allow universal imperatives and formal principles that are criteria for making our decisions. The imperatives are commands that tell us the reason for duty. The moral obligation is governed by two imperatives:

  1. Act in such a way that the maxim of your action can be transformed into universal law.
  2. Act in such a way that you take the person in you and your neighbor as an end in itself (value, dignity).

The action is good for Kant when duty arises. What is not duty is by immediate inclination or under any duty, i.e., do what I do but for a selfish reason; you do it for you. These actions are considered neutral and selfish (the immediate inclination not) as people were honest; he did wrong. What matters is that ethically prescribe, not a particular act, a particular content, but an inner disposition, a way of acting.

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Goodwill

It is free and is based on reason. In Kant, the good will is good in itself, not the end (purpose), not by the result, not to avoid punishment, it is from duty and will (will of the person, the intention). Happiness has to do with behaviors that one does good since they are based on goodwill. The difference of duty which are those which are contrary to duty (the bad) someone acts contrary to duty because it is disingenuous, dishonest. Distinguish behaviors that occur out of duty, of which there are immediate and consistent inclination to duty (neutral, have no moral courage to Kant). Good moral conduct has to do with the character (line behavior of individuals, behaviors that one learns). Temperament (internal climate of the person has to do with the endocrine system that has to do with the creation of hormones, formerly connected with blood as if a person is nervous is by temperament, marking the rhythm of the person, the innate characteristics of the person and the speed with which receives the stimulus and its response), good behavior for Kant is in the character. The result will not measure the value of a behavior; Kant cares if the person has independent decision, the will of the person.

Duty

Duty contains the concept of good will, although under certain subjective restrictions and obstacles, which, however, far from hiding and making it unknowable, rather because they do highlight and contrast appear more clearly.

Kant does not analyze the actions contrary to duty, as they are not good will, nor the line of duty, because there are those to which man is inclined immediately. You can easily distinguish whether the action according to duty or duty has been succeeded by a selfish intention. It is more difficult to notice the difference when the action is consistent with duty and the subject also has an immediate inclination to it.

The Moral Law

Duty is the need for action out of respect for the law. I have bent, but never respect precisely because it is an effect and not an activity of a will. There is nothing else that can determine the will, if not objectively the law (the same reason in all human beings) and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, respect for it. Kant said that the only principle of the universal will is the legality of actions in general. I cannot work anymore so you might want that my decision should become universal law.

The Imperatives of Morality

All imperatives are expressed by a “should be” and show the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which by its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by such law. All imperatives command, either hypothetically or categorically. They represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means of achieving anything you want. The categorical imperative is the one that represents an action by itself, without reference to any other purpose, as objectively necessary, i.e., not lying because I feel that I should not lie, without any constraints. This only works on a maxim such that you can at the same time it becomes universal law (the first imperative). The hypothetical imperative is from the logical point of view if P then Q, determines the duty to a certain result.

Humanity as an End

Assuming that there is something whose existence in itself has an absolute value as an end in itself and can be the basis of certain laws, it would be the basis for a possible categorical imperative. Practice of law (rule of action) the man is an end in itself, not only as means; beings whose existence rests in our will, but in nature, are irrational and they call things. Rational beings are called persons because their nature distinguishes them as ends in themselves. These are objective ends, that is, things whose existence is itself an end, which in its place cannot even get any other purpose which should serve as a means them.

The practical imperative will therefore work so that you use humanity, whether in your person and in the person of any other, always as an end at once and never simply as a means (second challenge).