Spain-USA 1953 Agreement: Military Bases and Economic Aid
The 1953 Agreement with the U.S.
Rating:
On September 26, 1953, James Clement Dunn, U.S. ambassador to Spain, and Alberto Martín Artajo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed an agreement in Madrid’s Palace of Santa Cruz. This bilateral pact addressed circumstantial, public, legislative, military, and economic issues.
Analysis:
The agreement encompassed two main ideas: the U.S. commitment to providing military support to Spain in exchange for joint military bases and U.S. provision of technical and financial assistance.
Historical Context
Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War led to a dictatorship lasting until his death in 1975. During World War II, Franco aided Hitler and Mussolini, ratifying a Friendship Pact with Germany, selling strategic materials to the Nazis, and sending the Blue Division to fight alongside the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.
Initially, the U.S. opposed Franco, along with Britain and France, stating that Spain could not expect full and friendly relations while he remained in power. Spain was barred from the United Nations and excluded from the 1948 Marshall Plan. Post-war Spain was economically weak, technologically backward, and politically isolated, only gaining UN admission in 1955.
The Cold War and Spain’s strategic location at the Mediterranean’s entrance prompted a shift in U.S. policy, favoring military bases to counter communist expansion. The Marshall Plan aimed for economic recovery.
Spain became crucial for completing the U.S. Strategic Air Command’s base deployment to encircle the Soviet Union. Initial agreements in 1951 brought vital resources to Franco’s regime. The 1953 bilateral agreement finalized U.S. aid in exchange for military bases at Torrejón, Zaragoza, and Rota (Cádiz).
Review of the Ideas
Dunn and Artajo signed three agreements: economic aid, defense, and mutual defense, committing both nations to defend against the “communist threat.”
In 1953, Franco announced to the Cortes that the Mutual Security agreements would provide desired military and economic assistance. Spanish authorities hoped to utilize the U.S.-assisted bases in case of external aggression.
Spain needed a stronger military to counter communist threats, improving its aviation and navy. Notably, the Foreign Minister was sidelined during negotiations, with Lieutenant-General Juan Vigón leading. The extent of concessions in secret clauses, contradicting public articles, was also significant. Spain pledged financial stability, competitiveness, productivity, international trade development, and a healthy economy. U.S. military equipment provision was limited to NATO’s general rearmament and WWII or Korean War surplus. Economic aid came with conditions, forcing Franco to accept changes undermining his autarky, paradoxically fostering economic and social development.
The aid aimed to prepare Spain for defense. Spain made major concessions, receiving limited economic benefits. The Mutual Defense agreement’s conditions, initially secret, committed both nations to international peace and security. However, Spain did not receive U.S. support in the Western Sahara or Ifni conflicts, suggesting the “threat” was solely communist.
Ambiguity surrounded the type of war material Spain would receive. A secret clause allowed U.S. involvement in war without reciprocal defense for Spain. While bases were under the Spanish flag, the U.S. had exclusive access and control, even regarding potential atomic weapons. In case of Soviet aggression, the U.S. would primarily inform the Madrid government.
Large parts of Spain lacked adequate defense. NATO prioritization meant Spain received surplus equipment. Franco compromised neutrality and sovereignty, prioritizing his interests, according to Preston. Base locations near major cities were deemed irresponsible.
Conclusion
Franco prioritized maintaining power, abandoning Spain’s neutrality policy, similar to his 1940 alignment with the Third Reich. He achieved international recognition, regime consolidation, and U.S. alliance, at the cost of limited sovereignty and war risk in the atomic age. Immediate benefits included military aid and quelling military discontent.
The U.S. facilitated Spain’s entry into the IMF and World Bank, becoming its largest foreign investor. For Franco, the agreement was a triumph, securing international respectability, UN membership (1955), and internal security with U.S. troops. Spain transformed from a marginalized nation to a U.S. partner, consolidating Franco’s dictatorship.
Bibliography:
Paul Preston. Franco: Caudillo of Spain. Barcelona, 1993.
Paul Preston. The Great Manipulator. Barcelona, 2008.