Spain’s Foreign Policy Evolution: From Isolation to European Integration
During the Franco era, Spain had a complex relationship with the international community. Since the 1950s, Spain was accepted at the UN and normalized relations with Western countries, but remained a secondary ally of the U.S. in the Cold War and, for political reasons, did not achieve entry into the EEC. After Franco died (1975), Spanish foreign policy changed: openness to the world, strengthening ties with Latin America and Europe, and a solid alliance with the Western bloc.
The main guidelines of Spanish foreign policy were:
- Maintaining relations with all states of the world.
- Strengthening defense ties with the Western bloc (despite initial opposition from the left): NATO (1982), ratified in 1985 by referendum.
- Integration in Europe: membership in the EEC (1986) and an active role in European integration.
- Understanding with North African countries, especially Morocco.
- Maintaining friendly and cooperative relations with Latin America.
- An active role in peace processes driven by the UN.
- Increased cooperation funds.
The death of Franco, the beginning of the political transition, and internal problems led external issues of international politics to take a back seat. Despite reluctance from the left, the center-right UCD had a clear objective: linking Spain to the democratic and capitalist Western bloc. With the advent of the transition, there were two trends: on one side, the center-right, supporters of NATO; on the other, the left, committed to a neutral position in the Cold War. Any chance of joining the Non-Aligned Movement was completely abandoned. A crisis that affected the final definition of Spain’s Atlanticist foreign policy was the Falklands War (1982), when Spain condemned Argentina’s use of force while supporting its territorial claim. Calvo Sotelo ultimately secured NATO membership (1982). Many viewed the military partnership as an unavoidable step for access to the political and economic union of the European Communities. The PSOE had initially opposed NATO membership, favoring neutrality or alignment with nonaligned countries. However, Felipe González promised a referendum on NATO membership. Access to power and integrating social policies in international organizations led the PSOE to modify its position. At the XXX Congress of the Socialist Party in 1984, the party’s position was established: to remain in NATO without integrating into its military structure. The right faced the dilemma of whether to support the PSOE’s defense of NATO or use the government’s change of position as a political weapon. The public was stunned by the shift in attitude, and peace movements in Madrid organized large protests. Felipe González used his charisma and personal prestige. Thus, in March 1986, 52.3% of Spanish voters said yes to the government’s question, although Spain still did not integrate into NATO’s military structure.
The European Union brings together more than 380 million inhabitants and its GDP is now surpassed only by the USA, making it the second world economic power. The EEC was formed in January 1958 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome. The initial objective was to create a space for the free movement of goods, capital, and labor. The Treaty of Rome was signed by the same six countries that signed the ECSC: the three Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg), France, Germany, and Italy. On January 1, 1973, three new countries joined: Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. Greece joined in 1981, resulting in a Europe of Ten. In 1986, Spain and Portugal entered: Europe of the Twelve. The enlargement of the EEC to include Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, the signing of partnership agreements with Greece, and the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which harmed Spain’s interests, led Franco’s governments to seek EEC admission. However, pressure from Spanish politicians gathered at the “conspiracy” of Munich and the lack of political democracy made European accession impossible. In 1970, Spanish diplomacy managed to secure a preferential trade agreement with the EC, reducing tariffs between Spain and the Community and creating strong economic ties, with the EC becoming Europe’s main buyer and supplier. Spain wanted to join at that time, but the dictatorial regime prevented it. With the advent of democracy in Spain, the aspiration of joining the EEC was shared by all political parties, and formal negotiations resumed. In 1986, after tough negotiations and significant concessions by Spain, the country became a member, along with Portugal, of an EEC that already included 10 states. On June 12, 1985, at the Palacio Real de Madrid, representatives of Spain and the EC signed the Accession Treaty, which entered into force on January 1, 1986. The Treaty involved significant short-term concessions from the Spanish government, assuming that long-term benefits would outweigh these issues. The accession marked the end of the “Spanish nationalist capitalism” approach to economic development. The supranational Treaty required Spain to cede sovereignty in numerous executive and legislative areas, including agriculture and social policies. The end of the Cold War provided a major impetus for European integration, shifting the focus from mere economic cooperation to political union and the creation of an economic and monetary union with a single currency managed by the ECB (the euro in 2002). During this period, Spain, newly integrated into the EEC, had to renegotiate the conditions of membership for the Canary Islands. The final solution was satisfactory, allowing the Canaries to maintain much of their low-taxation fiscal regime while simultaneously joining the CAP. Economically, Spain benefited from joining the EEC. The country became part of a large market where some products were very competitive. Additionally, Community Funds (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF) helped modernize infrastructure, training, and productivity. These benefits have tended to diminish as Spain has reached the average income level of the Union. Spain’s pro-Western stance increased, mainly during the Aznar administration (1996-2004) and in the context of the Islamist terrorist threat (e.g., 11-M attacks), with Spain supporting the U.S. War in Iraq (2003), against the views of traditional Spanish allies in Europe (France and Germany). With the Zapatero Government (PSOE, 2004), this orientation was revised, leading to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.