Swiss Government: Cooperation of Powers and Legislative Primacy

Posted on Feb 24, 2025 in Economic Sciences

Regarding the means of action of Parliament on the Government, it’s important to remember that Government members are elected by the Federal Assembly and, therefore, lack popular investiture. Moreover, the Government is obliged to submit an annual management report to the Houses, as well as special reports whenever they demand them. Furthermore, Parliament may address the Council with summons, postulates, and motions in order to change its policy or invite it to consider an issue or prepare a bill.

With regard to the means of action of the Government on Parliament, the Government is not totally devoid of legal action. It has legislative initiative, gives its views on the bills that are run by the Assemblies, and its members have access to the Assemblies and participate in its debates.

However, it cannot dissolve the Chamber and has no power over its meetings, nor to call them or to postpone them. It cannot raise the issue of trust or threaten to resign. The question is how to resolve conflicts between the executive and legislative branches.

If the Houses disagree with the Federal Council, they express their disbelief after questioning, but if the Council resigns, it remains in power, changing its policy in the sense intended by Parliament. Otherwise, the Assembly would find, in the rejection of the budget appropriations and the vote of the law, all necessary means to force it to cede. From the above, one can imagine that the Swiss political system is an example of the system of Assembly. Parliament elects a committee that must bend to its guidelines and obey its motions, unable to use the weapon of dissolution, not even the issue of trust or the threat of resignation. This is very similar to a regime in which the Executive is completely dominated by the Assembly. Legally, it is true that the Federal Council is only a body commissioned by the Assembly, forced to follow the policy of Parliament, unable to resign, and without which the Constitution gives effective means of pressure against the former.

However, as pointed out by several authors, a closer look reveals that, in this case, the conditions for a regime of Assembly are not met.

The Federal Assembly is not in permanent session. As the executive function is continuous, a parliament that holds session for 2 or 3 months a year cannot claim to exercise it. In fact, the Federal Assembly is obliged to leave the governing Federal Council. The executive body is unique. Both chambers need not necessarily have the same point of view, giving the executive more maneuverability and, therefore, more authoritative.

The Swiss Federal Council, the executive body, enjoys great stability. It is elected for 4 years, but in fact, federal advisors are re-elected indefinitely (mean duration 11 years). The permanence and the fact that bureaucracy has, therefore, technical competence, promise a considerable authority in front of the Assemblies.
The Federal Council has the right of legislative initiative, which is not within the Assembly Government scheme, as usually defined.
In these circumstances, it is understandable that the authority of the Federal Council is not, in fact, the power of a commissioner. Therefore, the Swiss political system is a special form of cooperation of powers, which, despite the constitutional and legal primacy of the legislature, the executive enjoys sufficient independence, mainly thanks to its stability, compared to an Assembly with a very short session.
For these reasons, it has been called the Swiss Government a Directorial regime rather than a Government House. However, in the event of disagreement between the Legislative and the Executive, it is the latter which should be leaning. Switzerland has carried out the government of the Legislature, not the dictatorship of the Assembly, but by a legal precedence for this, which becomes effective in important circumstances.