Understanding Fundamental Rights in the Spanish Constitution
Display: a) What the statute means: objective and subjective status of fundamental rights, b) Identify each statute in the three subgroups of rights under the Spanish Constitution of 1978.
The objective of the statute states that rights are legal standards, functioning as legal duties or obligations. Since the rights were transferred to positivism as standards, the nature of legal rules is their objective status. The positive nature of rights means that generally, there are no more rights for citizens than those enshrined in constitutions. Moreover, regarding subjective status, it can be said that since this statute establishes rights as standards (fundamental) of the legal system, it is pertinent to question whether the individual plays a role in implementing such standards. That is, the subjective status relates to the individual’s ability to engage in disputes through legal procedures that guarantee performance assessment by public authorities to create rules containing rights. SUBGROUPS:
- 1st subgroup: This subgroup has only one objective status; its role is to guide legislation, judicial practice, and actions of public authorities. The content is in the hands of public authorities, as they are only alleged rights becoming the subjective status of legal rights but not the subjective status of constitutional rights.
- 2nd subgroup: These rights are binding on the government and must respect their legal regulation. This subgroup presents a more objectively protected status than the first subgroup. The subjective status also has the legal right character reinforced by the relationship and respect for their essential content.
- 3rd subgroup: Besides its objective status as an objective legal subsystem, this subgroup has a very marked subjective status. Subjective rights are guaranteed expedited alternatives to ordinary common procedures for all warranty rights and have subjective amparo to the Constitutional Court after the prior litigation period.
Interpretation and Application of the Law: Exposing and Commenting on the Three Criteria for Interpreting Facts.
The structure of any sentence comprises a heading, factual elements, legal arguments, and a decision. The core of interpretation is not only based on legal grounds but also on factual elements, i.e., in the interpretation of facts. In judicial activities concerning events, there are three different times: 1 – The time of evidence acquisition, which refers to how evidence is introduced at trial; this phase is regulated in detail in trial laws. 2 – The time of the decision on the main event, which will determine the socket that the judge applies to the facts (minor premise) in the appropriate standard (major premise). 3 – The time of evidence assessment, which occurs between the two previous times, is central to the court’s experience. This involves evaluating the evidence, resulting in the determination of facts, where the yield from each source is considered. This operation is not legally regulated; it is governed by the principle of self-belief, and the formation of such conviction represents the moment when the judge is most autonomous and could be more arbitrary.
Exposing the Five Rationalities of the Theory of Legislation.
Linguistic Rationality: The legal system consists of a set of statements organized in a language and through channels that ensure the transmission of messages. The law is the message; the edictor is the creator of the law, and the recipient may be one who has to comply or not comply, but they must be able to decipher its linguistic content. If language is addressed to all people, it uses natural language; if it is technical, it is directed at specialists. Formal Legal Rationality: This refers to the edictor being determined by law and in accordance with the established procedure. A law can be considered irrational if it contributes to the erosion of the legal structure. Pragmatic Rationality: The effectiveness of law is a value of any rule of law; the edictor behaves as sovereign, as their capacity as state power depends on the effectiveness of laws to ensure compliance. A law is irrational if it fails as a directive behavior, i.e., when it fails to influence the conduct of the addressees of the law. Teleological Rationality: The edictors are the bearers of particular and general social interests, which are translated and protected by law. The law aims to achieve or promote specific social goals or objectives. A law is irrational if it produces unforeseen effects that cannot be regarded as desirable. Ethical Rationality: The edictors are those entitled to make laws; parliament is seen as the body that produces laws as a representative of popular sovereignty in an ethical sense. A law is irrational if it is not ethically justified. Ethical values such as freedom, equality, and justice must be present in the content of laws.
Features of the Legal System as a System of Rules: Unity, Coherence, and Completeness.
The characteristics of the legal system (unity, coherence, and completeness) are not predicable of any particular rules. Even the Constitution, as the “standard unit” for the rest of the standards, meets the two requirements of consistency and completeness. In Spain, there are various constitutions, but only one. The idea of “unity” can only be fully achieved when the unit is preached to the attributes of consistency and completeness. A “unit” that is incoherent and incomplete may still be considered a “unity,” but it goes far beyond the realm of legally acceptable. Any rule, including the Constitution, requires interpretation to argue that a rule is “consistent” with the legal system (fullness) it integrates. Thus, we conclude: a) The property of unity, in modern constitutional legal systems, can be reduced to a “given” based on the verification of the existence of a single constitution; b) The property of consistency is predicated on isolated standards, and through the early resolution of conflicts between rules (lex posterior derogat priori, lex superior derogat inferior, lex specialis derogat generalis), coherent meaning is provided to any rule; c) The property of completeness (rational closure of the system) is characteristic of the idea of law, as fullness is not predicable of the standard system (Constitution) or any other lower standard. Therefore, the idea of completeness contains the very meaning of law. A legal system can have unity and coherence but not be considered rational.