Understanding the Structure and Function of the Spanish Parliament
III. Organization of the Cameras.
Parliament, like all parliaments, is a deliberative body composed of a large number of members. To ensure that the large number of components does not obstruct the performance of parliamentary functions, a suitable structure must be provided. For this purpose, governing bodies and functioning bodies are established.
III.1. Governing Bodies.
The governing bodies of the Chamber are the President, the Bureau, and the Board of Spokesmen.
III.1.1) President.
The President is the ultimate authority of the House. He represents the House, directs discussions in plenary sessions, interprets the regulations in cases of doubt, and addresses omissions. He is also part of the Bureau, directing and coordinating its work. The President is elected among the members at the inaugural meeting by a ballot vote, where each Member of Parliament writes a name. In the first vote, an absolute majority is necessary for election; if this is not achieved, a second vote is held in which the candidate with the most votes is elected. The role of the President as interpreter and enforcer of regulations is one of his most important powers.
III.1.2) The Bureau.
The Bureau is chaired by the Speaker of the House and consists of several vice presidents (4 in Congress and 2 in the Senate) and Secretaries. It is also elected during the constituent session of the Chambers by a ballot system, where each MP can only enter one name for each office to be designated sequentially, obtaining the most votes. The Bureau is the governing body of the House and organizes and directs the work of Parliament. It plays a leading role in the administrative and managerial aspects of the House, while the political role has shifted to the Board of Spokesmen. The Bureau decides on the processing of papers and records, sets the work schedule of the House, and is responsible for providing the necessary materials for the functioning of the House. Additionally, it has a residual clause for functions not expressly attributed to another organ.
III.1.3) The Board of Spokesmen.
This relatively modern body reflects the leading role that parliamentary groups have acquired in the parliamentary system. The President also serves as the President of the Board of Spokesmen. It consists of a representative (spokesperson) for each parliamentary group, along with a representation from the Government. Decisions are taken by weighted vote, so each spokesperson has as many votes as there are members in their parliamentary group. This is a highly political body that institutionalizes the relationship between the government and the House, and it is uncertain where the opinion of the parliamentary groups on functioning lies. The Board of Spokesmen, in accordance with the President, sets or modifies the agenda of the plenary.
III.2. Operating Bodies.
Along with their governing bodies, the chambers also have functioning organs through which parliamentary work is conducted.
III.2.A) Plenary.
The plenary comprises all the members of the House. It is the most important body where public acts of parliament occur, as its meetings tend to have the greatest impact. Therefore, it is reserved for fully-featured and deep debates over political content, relegating the work of the Commissions to more technical or specialized matters that receive less public attention. Members of the Government may also attend, having a voice but no vote, unless they are members of the House. Members of the other House may also attend but are disenfranchised. The seating arrangement of Deputies in the meeting hall is in accordance with their membership in parliamentary groups. For resolutions to be valid, it is necessary for the chambers to be assembled according to regulations and for a majority of members to be present (quorum) (art. 79.1 CE). Plenary sessions are held mainly during the sessions but can also be celebrated extraordinarily, outside of constitutionally provided periods. There are full sets of the two Houses to exercise legislative powers not expressly conferred by Title II to Parliament in relation to the Crown (art. 74.1 CE). The sessions are chaired by the President of Congress and governed by a specific regulation adopted by an absolute majority of each house, operating as a supplementary source not provided by the Orders of Congress.
III.2.B) Commissions.
Commissions are parliamentary bodies that undertake groundwork; without them, the plenary would not function properly. The role of the plenary is increasingly concentrated in major political debates. Commissions can be of various kinds: they may be permanent or ongoing, and within the first, they may be legislative or non-legislative in nature, serving as managers or administrators, such as requests or control bodies like the Ombudsman. Non-permanent parliamentary committees, called special committees, are established by resolution of the Plenum of the Chamber for a specific purpose, limiting their jurisdiction to the matter for which they were created, and are dissolved once the purpose is fulfilled. Finally, the chambers can create, either separately or jointly, Commissions of Inquiry on matters of public interest. Legislative Standing Committees are a regular body of the Chamber, each assigned an area of competence corresponding roughly to a ministry or specific political action (e.g., Treasury, Justice, Foreign Affairs, etc.). Their basic function is to meet and discuss in detail the projects and pending bills, developing an opinion that serves as the basis for the plenary’s work, which normally approves it in substance. The Constitution provides that, in some cases, committees can assume full legislative powers, allowing projects or bills to be directly approved by the committees without passing through the House, provided that certain matters are affected (Article 75.2 and 3). This is often due to the technical nature of a bill, which does not warrant plenary debate, allowing for quicker processing. The composition of the committees is designed to achieve a representation of the plenary on a reduced scale. Thus, each parliamentary group in the committees has a number of representatives proportional to their numbers in the House. Each parliamentary group is free to designate their representatives in the respective committees, providing expertise from its members, with the only limitation being that every member of parliament is entitled to at least one Committee.
III.2.C) The Permanent Deputation.
The Permanent Deputation is an organ of the Chamber intended to cover the gaps that occur during parliamentary recess, that is, between two session periods, and the time between the dissolution of the Chambers or expiration of their mandate and the constitution of new elected Chambers. In the latter case, when the House is dissolved, its mandate and that of its members has expired. To avoid a long period without parliamentary organs, the technique of prorrogatio is used, a legal fiction under which the mandate is considered persistent until a new mandate is established. According to the Constitution, the Permanent Deputations must have at least twenty-one members who represent the parliamentary groups in proportion to their numbers and are appointed by them (art. 78.1 CE). They are chaired by the Speaker of the House. The functions of the Permanent Deputation vary significantly depending on whether they are in recess or dissolved. During parliamentary recess, they must safeguard the powers of the House and convene extraordinary plenary sessions when deemed appropriate, but they are obliged to the Provincial Congress in cases provided for in Article 86.2 EC – validation of decree-laws and 116-CE – exceptional states. In the event of dissolution of the Chambers, the Permanent Deputations perform the functions of the chambers until the constitution of the new houses. In this case, since the mandate of the House has already expired, the Provincial Congress supplements it, responsible for recognizing decree-laws and assuming the functions of Congress in connection with states of alarm, emergency, or siege. When the constitution of the new houses takes place, the Permanent Deputations are accountable for the matters to be treated and their decisions.
III.2.D) The Parliamentary Groups.
The parliamentary groups are the organs of each House that bring together parliamentarians from the same political orientation, who normally attended the elections under the same party acronym and organize and coordinate all their parliamentary activity. They are the parliamentary translation of political parties. Regulations prohibit the formation of separate parliamentary groups by members of the same political party or those standing for election on the same lists, to avoid creating artificial groups that could exploit shifts in debate, etc. They play a key role in the organization and functioning of Parliament. Parliamentary groups respond to the need to streamline parliamentary life, which would be impossible if parliamentarians acted individually. They organize and simplify parliamentary life. To form a group, a minimum number of members is required:
– In Congress, at least 15 MPs or 5 MEPs if they received 5% of the votes cast nationwide, or 15% of the votes in the constituencies where they submitted nominations.
– In the Senate, at least 10 senators are required.
Joining a group is statutorily required, so parliamentary political forces without enough seats to reach that minimum cannot form their own group and are assigned to the Joint Panel, which brings together representatives from a wide range of ideologies. The functions of parliamentary groups are of two kinds. Some, such as coordinating the activities of MPs, defining parliamentary party politics, or controlling the government, whether in opposition or support, if it is a majority, are internal regulations and are not provided. Others, although scattered, include contributing to the composition of the Board of Spokesmen and Commissions, exerting legislative initiative, setting positions in debates in plenary and committees, attributing speaking turns, and authorizing amendments to projects and bills. Finally, it should be noted that the Senate Rules enable the creation of regional groups within each parliamentary group, as internal joints to strengthen the territorial dimension of the parliamentary groups. A territorial group will be composed of senators elected by a parliamentary group in one region or designated by the Legislature and must have at least three senators. Representatives of regional groups may attend meetings of the Board of Spokesmen of the Senate with the spokesman of their parliamentary group and can participate in plenary debates that affect their respective region.
IV. Management of Parliamentary Work.
The Legislature lasts four years unless there is an early dissolution. Its completion marks the expiration of the parliamentary work in progress, so projects or bills of a certain length or complexity sent late to the houses shall not be approved.
Congress must be convened within 25 days after the elections (art. 68.6 CE 62.by).
A) Sessions.
Under the Constitution, the Houses shall meet annually for two ordinary sessions: the first from September to December and the second from February to June (art. 73.1 CE). For exceptional cases, the Constitution provides that special meetings may be held at the request of the Government, the Permanent Deputation, or the absolute majority of the members of the House. The application for notice must include the proposed agenda, and the session must adhere to it. If the government approves a parliamentary recess during the legislative decree, the House of Congress is automatically called to resolve their recognition (art. 86.2 CE). The House of Congress is also called immediately in the event of a declaration of a state of alarm, emergency, or siege. In both cases, if the House was dissolved, it shall be the Standing Committee. Ordinary parliamentary activity is reduced to nine months. In March 2010, a political agreement was reached in Congress and the Senate to hold special sessions during the parliamentary recess in January and July, without altering the Constitution. It is sufficient for the Speaker of the House to convene the Board of Spokesmen and officers of the House and the Permanent Delegation to prepare the agenda for the extraordinary plenary session. However, this agreement does not prevent January and July from being unfit months.
B) Requirements for Validity.
For meetings of the Chambers to be valid, they must first have been called according to regulations (art. 79.1 CE). Meetings held without such a call are not valid and shall not be covered by parliamentary privilege (art. 67.3 CE). Second, to adopt agreements, the mandatory quorum in both houses is the majority, which is more than half of the members. The purpose of the quorum is to prevent a small group of members from taking advantage of the absence of the majority to adopt resolutions, and its existence is presumed unless someone requests a recount or a ballot finds its absence. Calls for Chambers should include an agenda or list of matters to be discussed at the meeting. Any item not included in it cannot be treated. Article 111 EC requires that a minimum weekly time be saved to address questions and inquiries that deputies and senators present to the Government. The afternoon sessions on Wednesday in Congress and Tuesday in the Senate are designated for this purpose.
C) Advertising.
Plenary sessions are public unless otherwise agreed by each House, adopted by an absolute majority or under the Regulations. The general principle of parliamentary proceedings is, therefore, transparency, resulting in the existence of public galleries in plenary sessions, especially for media access. Similarly, transparency is achieved through the respective Official Gazettes and Journals of Session of Congress and the Senate, which contain verbatim reproductions of the discussions. Sessions are usually held from Tuesday to Friday in Congress and Tuesday through Thursday in the Senate. Commission sessions, in general, are not public, although they have media access and are reported in relevant newspapers.
D) Management of Debates.
Discussion shifts are assigned to parliamentary groups, designating their spokesperson for each debate. Except for isolated incidents, an MP cannot speak individually. The Government may intervene at any time during the debate. Regulations discipline the order of interventions and their duration. In any case, the President can always, according to the Bureau, end a discussion if he believes the issue has been sufficiently debated. All these provisions aim to order the debate and avoid practices known as obstruction or buccaneering, which consist of trying to stop an initiative from being approved by successive long interventions.
E) Voting.
The general rule for the adoption of agreements is a simple majority of those present, meaning more votes for than against, provided that quorum is reached, which requires attendance by most members. Only in cases specifically provided may a reinforced qualified majority or absolute majority (half plus one member of the House), most 3/5 of the members, or a majority of 2/3 be required. The form of voting (electronically, by agreement, etc.) is usually irrelevant but becomes important in cases where it is in the public interest to know the position of parliamentarians, such as in the legislative procedure for the inauguration of the President of the Government or on motions of no confidence or trust issues. Hence, in these cases, secret ballots are excluded, and the vote must be public to identify each Member’s vote. The chambers are led by their presidents, assisted by officers called multi-member bodies of the Chamber. The President holds all administrative and police powers. In this function, he assists the Bureau, whose powers include leading the organization and internal governance of the House, deciding on the processing of written documents, and setting the schedule for plenary and committee sessions.
The Lesson 18
General Courts and Its Structure
I. Composition.
The Spanish Parliament, referred to as the Cortes Generales historically, is bicameral, consisting of two chambers:
– Congress of Deputies (the lower house), which is the chamber of popular representation.
– Senate (the upper house), which is the chamber of territorial representation.
The Spanish Constitution opts for an imperfect bicameral system, which gives greater power to the Congress in several issues, resulting in an imbalance in favor of the Congress as the central axis of Parliament. The Senate is relegated to a secondary position, even in typical parliamentary functions such as legislative functions and control of Congress. Regarding the first, it is Congress that decides whether to accept the veto or amendments from the Senate to projects and bills, and it is the only chamber that can confer organic law status to legislation. In relation to the latter, Congress holds the trust of the government and Parliament, characteristic of a parliamentary system, while the Senate does not intervene, as is the case in Italy. Only Congress can grant and withdraw, if necessary, confidence in the Prime Minister, while the Senate has no attribution regarding the appointment and removal of the Government. Similarly, only Congress validates decree-laws and exercises functions related to states of alert, emergency, and location, reflecting Congress’s superiority over the Senate.
However, the existence of a second chamber is justified for two different reasons. The first is that the Senate, which refers projects and propositions of law once approved by Congress, serves as a double reflection chamber or second reading, designed to mitigate political tensions or technically improve the texts adopted. The second and main reason for the Senate is to establish a House of Representatives for the Autonomous Communities, as befits a composed state. However, the constitutional regulation has not favored this function, which is very diluted, as only about one-fifth of the senators are representatives of the Autonomous Community, designated by the autonomous parliaments, while four-fifths are elected directly by citizens through a majoritarian system that favors the second-largest party in the constituency base of the province or, in some cases, on the island. Furthermore, although the Constitution assigns some specific functions related to the CCAA to the Senate, its role as the chamber of territorial representation is not well defined. Hence, there is broad consensus on the desirability of reforming the Senate to correct this imperfect bicameralism, allowing it to fulfill its role as a chamber of territorial representation.
II. Parliamentary Prerogatives.
To ensure the proper performance of the representative function, democratic parliaments endow the Houses and their members with a series of prerogatives that provide safeguards necessary for those who have obtained the representation of the people to perform their tasks without interference. Their purpose is to ensure the freedom of action of the chambers and, hence, their absolute independence.
II.1. The Collective Powers of the Houses.
The principle of parliamentary autonomy encompasses the collective powers of the Houses, which are attributed to the Chambers collectively as a body.
II.1.a) Regulatory Autonomy.
It is the faculty of each House to regulate its operation and organization by adopting its own rules (art. 72.1 CE). The regulation thus becomes the main source of law regulating the internal life of the Houses. The regulations may only be approved or amended by a majority of each House. A reserve is set for regulations, as no other standard than the rules of the House may regulate its organization and operation. There are laws, even though they are issued by the legislature, as they are approved by one of its chambers without following the legislative process. However, there are regulations that have the force of law, as reflected in art. 27.2 OLCC, under which MPs can be controlled for unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court. The regulations of the Chambers are complemented by resolutions issued by their presidencies under their authority to interpret in cases of doubt and to replace those of omission. They are thus sources of parliamentary law. There are, strictly speaking, three parliamentary regulations, as to each of the chambers must be added the Parliament under Art. 72.2 EC, which must be approved by an absolute majority of each of the chambers and is designed to regulate the joint sessions of Congress and Senate.
II.1.b) Administrative Autonomy.
This is the power of self-government at all levels. Thus, the Houses elect their governing bodies, which hold all administrative powers and police powers within their headquarters. It also includes self-regulatory authority concerning the staff of the chambers and administrative powers. Their decisions are not subject to court audit (domestic doctrine corporis minutes), unless legal regulations (which are amenable to the TC), parliamentary acts that violate any fundamental right (challenged by the defense before the Constitutional Court), and the acts and provisions of the governing bodies of the chambers regarding personnel and administration (appealable to the Contentious-Administrative Court).
II.1.c) Budgetary Autonomy.
The Constitution also grants the ability to approve their own budgets independently (art. 72.1 CE). This provision seeks to prevent the
constitutionally established reserves for the Government from using the draft Budget Law (Article 134.1 EC) as a weapon of economic strangulation against Parliament, denying them the resources needed to fulfill their tasks. Thus, the draft budget prepared by each house for itself integrates directly into the State Budget without any governmental involvement.
II.1.d) Inviolability.
Finally, the Constitution establishes that the Cortes Generales are inviolable (art. 66.3 CE). This implies the impossibility of requiring the courts to hold them responsible for their parliamentary proceedings, thus avoiding disruptions to their operation. Members of Parliament cannot be sued or even cited as witnesses.
II.2. The Prerogatives of Individual Parliamentarians.
Other constitutional guarantees are designed not for the body, but for the members themselves. Art. 71 EC identifies three prerogatives, privileges that are not personal but non-functional guarantees that protect the MP, ensuring the independence and freedom of the chambers. Therefore, there are rights of parliamentarians, which they can freely waive.
II.2.a) Inviolability (Article 71.1 EC).
This is the prerogative of a substantive nature that guarantees the legal irresponsibility of the views expressed by parliamentarians in the exercise of their functions, defined as those engaged in acts of parliament, within any of the actions of the House or, as an exception, in external acts that are verbatim reproductions of a parliamentary act. Hence, they cannot be prosecuted or recorded for those opinions or votes cast, enabling the convergence of views. It serves the freedom of expression and the free formation of the will of the legislature. The immunity is an absolute guarantee that protects against any disciplinary proceedings arising from parliamentary activity, regardless of their field (criminal, labor, administrative). Its effects are temporary and indefinite, in the sense that it ends with the conclusion of the parliamentary mandate, so no disciplinary proceedings may be initiated once Parliament ceases to exist. However, inviolability does not exclude any sanctions that the chambers can impose on their members under their disciplinary powers for unwarranted verbal discussions.
II.2.b) Immunity (art. 71.2 CE).
This is the prerogative of a formal nature based on the principle that Members cannot be arrested, except in cases of flagrant crime, or prosecuted for alleged crimes or faults, without permission from the House (request). It aims to protect the personal liberty of the people’s representatives against arrests and prosecutions that could result in imprisonment, preventing political manipulations that could hinder their attendance at parliamentary meetings. It ensures that parliamentary proceedings are not subject to political persecution, avoiding alterations to the composition and functioning of Parliament. This authorization must be requested through the Supreme Court. If the request is not granted, there are no further proceedings against the parliamentarian, although actions may continue against other defendants. The temporal scope of immunity coincides with the duration of the parliamentary mandate. Its effects are retroactive, meaning that if a person is elected as an MP while being prosecuted, authorization from the Chamber is required to continue the procedure. Furthermore, if the elected member is being held or prosecuted, they must be released immediately. Immunity is limited to criminal matters and does not apply to civil proceedings.
II.2.c) Special Jurisdiction (art. 71.3 CE).
Finally, parliamentarians enjoy special privileges. The competent body to deal with criminal cases against deputies and senators is the Division of Criminal Justice. This body meets in the first and only instance, depriving the parliamentary right to two levels of jurisdiction or the right of appeal to review the sentence. This deprivation is justified by the need for the body prosecuting cases against MPs to enjoy the highest levels of independence, impartiality, and legal qualification, which represents an additional guarantee for parliamentarians.