Wittgenstein’s Two Philosophical Periods
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Two Periods
1. Early Wittgenstein: Logical Atomism
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus presents his early philosophy. The core idea is that the world’s structure mirrors the logical structure of language.
A. The World
Wittgenstein posits that the world comprises atomic facts, which are indivisible, causal, contingent, and independent. These facts consist of simple objects or things.
B. Pictorial Meaning
Language, according to Wittgenstein, pictorially represents the world. Propositions in language correspond to facts in the world. Names have meaning (the objects they name), but only propositions have sense (a logical form). A proposition is true if its structure matches the fact it represents, and false otherwise. Language acts as a map of reality.
C. Limits of Language: The Mystical
Meaningful propositions represent possible real-world events. True propositions belong to natural science. What lies outside language is beyond the world: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” Wittgenstein distinguishes between ‘saying’ (propositions) and ‘showing’ (logical form). Metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics reside beyond language’s representational capacity. Philosophy’s role is to clarify the logical form of propositions, showing what can be said and what cannot. The Tractatus itself presents a paradox by expressing what can only be shown.
2. Later Wittgenstein: Ordinary Language Philosophy
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations marks a break from the Tractatus, shifting focus to ordinary language. The approach becomes a posteriori and pragmatic.
A. A New Conception of Language
This shift stems from abandoning three tenets of logical atomism: the world’s logical configuration, the existence of simple elements within atomic facts, and the idea that a term’s meaning is the named object.
B. Multiple Language Uses
Learning a language is learning its use. Languages are defined by their use in specific contexts, like “language games.” Language is an activity, with each form having its own life and offering a particular world view. Languages can be described but learned only through use. Each language has its own rules; private language is impossible. Wittgenstein compares language to a toolbox with multiple instruments.
C. The Functions of Philosophy
Wittgenstein, still thinks that philosophy should serve to clarify what can and what can not be said. Does two intertwined: 1 function and clarifying descriptive philosophy. philosophy can not interfere with the effective use of ordinary language, or justify or substantiate it must be spent to understand and describe the philosophy “let sleeping dogs lie” 2 ยบ Therapeutic role of philosophy.. For Wittgenstein, many philosophical problems arising from misunderstanding of certain uses language to confuse a language game with another or consider any particular language game as the sole legitimate. In other cases, problems are philosophical perplexities produced within a language game whose rules are not clearly established. Wittgenstein suggests that addressing these problems, the philosopher must look back into ordinary language. The aim is to return them to use metaphysical or regular daily use, the error of metaphysics is to get the words out of context and give them another meaning. Philosophical activity should disappear showing philosophical problems because of its appearance, which is nothing but confusion. Wittgenstein compares the treatment of philosophical problems with the treatment of a disease, noting that metaphysical thinking is a language disorder that deviates from its normal use and that this deviation should be cured.